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In the past two elections, richer people were more likely to vote Republican while richer states were
more likely to vote Democratic.  This switch is an aggregation reversal, where an individual relationship,
like income and Republicanism, is reversed at some level of aggregation.  Aggregation reversals can
occur when an independent variable impacts an outcome both directly and indirectly through a correlation
with beliefs.  For example, income increases the desire for low taxes but decreases belief in Republican
social causes.  If beliefs are learned socially, then aggregation can magnify the connection between
the independent variable and beliefs, which can cause an aggregation reversal.  We estimate the model's
parameters for three examples of aggregation reversals, and show with these parameters that the model















I.  Introduction 
 
Richer people are more likely to vote Republican: Figure 1 shows this connection using 
2000 data from the National Annenberg Election Survey.  Figure 2 shows that richer 
states are more likely to vote Democratic in the same election.   More educated people 
attend church more regularly, as shown in Figure 3, but as Figure 4 shows, more educated 
denominations have far lower attendance rates (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2002).   Figure 5 
shows the positive individual level relationship between income and service in the 
military; Figure 6 shows the negative state level relationship between the same two 
variables.
1   
 
These three examples are aggregation reversals where a statistical relationship at the 
individual level is reversed at some level of aggregation, like the state or denomination.  
On a statistical level, aggregation reversals illustrate the ecological fallacy that aggregate 
relationships easily inform us about individual level parameters (e.g. King, 1997).  In this 
literature, aggregation reversals can result from an unusual distribution of omitted 
variables across units of aggregation.  But this insight does not help us to understand the 
economic causes of aggregation reversals which might help us to generate predictions 
about when these reversals might occur.
2      
 
In Section II, we present an economic model of aggregation reversals that relies on the 
social formation of beliefs.  The model assumes one exogenous variable, which could be 
education or income, and one endogenous outcome, like voting Republican or Church 
attendance.   Three ingredients generate an aggregation reversal.  First, the exogenous 
variable must have both a direct effect on the outcome and a correlation with beliefs 
about the returns to the outcome.  Second, the direct effect of the exogenous variable on 
the outcome must go in the opposite direction of the correlation that works through 
beliefs.  For example, higher incomes might be associated both with a dislike for taxes 
                                                 
1 Data sources are described in the data appendix.   
2 One way of understanding the difference between our approach and the ecological inference literature is 
that this literature sees aggregate information as a means of inferring individual level parameters, while we 
see aggregate relationships as intrinsically interesting.      3
and more liberal social beliefs.  The dislike of taxes pushes richer people towards 
Republicanism; the liberal social views push them away from Republicanism.  Third, 
beliefs must also reflect social learning which creates a social multiplier so that the 
aggregate relationship between beliefs and the exogenous variable is much stronger than 
the individual relationship between those two variables.      
 
None of these assumptions will always hold.  Exogenous variables are often unrelated to 
beliefs.  Often, variables that increase the direct returns to some activity will also be 
correlated with beliefs that make the activity even more attractive.  In that case, the social 
formation of beliefs will create a more standard social multiplier (as in Glaeser, 
Scheinkman and Sacerdote, 2003).   The unusual nature of our assumptions is compatible 
with the fact that aggregation reversals are themselves unusual.  
 
If these three assumptions do hold, then the model predicts when aggregation reversal 
will occur.  For an aggregation reversal, the ratio of direct effect of the exogenous 
variable on the outcome to the indirect effect that works through beliefs must lie between 
an upper and lower bound.  The lower bound is somewhat greater than one.  The upper 
bound is the social multiplier in the formation of beliefs.  When this social multiplier is 
larger because beliefs strongly reflect social influence, then aggregation reversals become 
more likely.  Aggregation reversals are more likely when the beliefs correlate strongly 
with the exogenous variable.  Greater sorting across groups on the basis of the exogenous 
variable makes a reversal less likely.    
 
In Section III, we present an empirical methodology to calibrate our model.  We use 
individual level relationships and the aggregate relationship between beliefs and the 
exogenous variable to predict the aggregate relationship between the exogenous variable 
and the outcome.  The goal of this calibration is to show the plausibility of our model, not 
to reject alternative explanations for the aggregation reversal.    
 
In Section IV, we look at the relationship between income and voting for George Bush in 
2000.  The rich were more likely to vote for Bush but less likely to agree with Republican   4
social policies on prayer in schools or limits on abortion.  The negative relationship 
between social policy views and income is much stronger at the state level than at the 
individual level, which suggests a sizable social multiplier.  Finally, views on social 
policy are highly correlated with voting for Bush, which implies that these beliefs impact 
the outcome. Together these facts predict an aggregation reversal that is larger than the 
one we empirically observe.   
 
In Section V, we return to the relationship between education and religion discussed by 
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002).  Education is positively associated with church attendance 
but negatively associated with belief in the devil or the literal truth of the Bible.   The 
denominational correlation between education and these beliefs is much stronger than the 
individual correlation, which again suggests a large social multiplier.  These beliefs are 
also highly correlated with attendance and seem to be important determinants of religious 
observance.  Our parameter estimates again predict an aggregation reversal that is bigger 
than the one that we see in the data.    
 
In Section VI, we examine the relationship between income and military service.  Income 
is positively correlated with military service but negatively associated with pro-military 
beliefs.  The income-belief relationship gets stronger at the state level, but the implied 
social multiplier is smaller than in our two other examples.  The relationship between 
pro-military beliefs and military service is also weaker than the relationship between 
religious beliefs and religious attendance or social policy beliefs and voting Republican.  
Our results are mixed.  Using one of our belief measures, we almost exactly predict the 
actual aggregation reversal.  The other belief measure fails to predict any aggregation 
reversal.  Section VII concludes.   
  
II.  The Social Formation of Beliefs and Aggregation Reversals 
 
In this model, individuals base a choice, denoted  i Y  on net benefits, which are known, 
and benefits which are assessed.  Specifically, we assume that total benefits of  i Y  equal   5
i i Y X A ) ( β γ + , where β  is known and A is estimated.  The costs of 
2 5 . i Y  so expected 
utility maximization implies  i i X A E Y β γ + = ) ( .   The variable  i X  is meant to capture any 
variable, perhaps income or education, which might plausibly increase (or decrease) the 
benefits of the activity; β  and γ  are parameters that we normalize to be positive.   By 
assumption,  i X  has a direct impact on the choice of  i Y .  To produce an aggregation 
reversal,  i X  must also have an indirect impact through the expectation of A.   
 
The expectation of A is based on a common prior, a private signal and the 
communication of those signals within a community group.   The common prior for A 
has mean zero and variance 
2
A σ .  Each individual receives a private signal equal to 
i i cX A η κ + + + , where  i η  is an individual-specific normally distributed error term with 
mean zero and variance 
2
η σ , and κ  is a normally distributed common error term with 
mean zero and variance 
2
κ σ .  The  i cX  term reflects the possibility that signals may be 
correlated with individual background attributes.  Through communication, people learn 
the signals of a set of Z neighbors.  The neighbors’ signals are garbled in transmission so 
that individual i learns 
i
z z cX A µ η κ + + + +  from individual z, where 
i
z µ  is the mean-
zero garbling with variance 
2
µ σ .   
 
The communication of signals is one way of capturing the social learning that is critical 
to our model.  This social learning creates the possibility for a correlation between an 
exogenous variable and a belief to grow with the level of aggregation.  Asch (1955) 
pioneered a psychological literature showing that base their stated beliefs on the 
statements of others, even about something so seemingly obvious as the length of a line.  
While some authors have suggested that Asch’s results show just a tendency to conform 
in statements, not in beliefs, Berns et al. (2005) use brain scans to show that statements 
by peers about shapes cause activity in the parts of the brain associated with spatial 
analysis not in the parts of the brain associated with social relations.  Bandura (1977) is a 
classic text on the importance of social learning.   Within economics, Merlo and Schotter 
(2001) is just one of the many papers on the power of social learning in experimental   6
settings.
3   There is abundant evidence on the importance of learning from people around 
us.       
 
We consider two cases, both of which are structured to eliminate learning about c.  First, 
we assume that  0
2 > κ σ , c is known to equal zero and that 
2
η σ  is a function of X,  ) ( i X v .  
Second, we assume that  0 = κ  and c>0, but that individuals have an incorrect assessment 
of c, denoted c, that they fail to update. In this case, we assume that 
2
η σ  is a constant. 
The first case assumes that individual attributes doesn’t bias signals, but create more or 
less precision.  In this case, actors are fully rational.
4  The second case assumes that the 
individual attribute biases the signal and this bias is not fully corrected.   This second 
case assumes limited rationality.   
 
In the first case, standard signal extraction implies that the estimate of A equals:  
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3 There is also an extensive theoretical literature on social learning in economics following Kandori, 
Mailaith and Rob (1993) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995).   
4 A variant of this assumption might be that an individual attribute causes over-optimism about the 
precision of the signal, as in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).     7
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δ .  If we assume that the average characteristics of the communicating 
neighbors equal the average characteristics of people in community j, denoted  j X ˆ , then 
the equation can be rewritten:   
 












= λ .   Values of “X” that reduce the variance of signals will change 
posterior beliefs and, on average, increase the accuracy of those beliefs.  Of course, in 
settings when that error term is sufficiently large, changes in “X” that increase the 
precision of signals can actually make realized ex post assessments more biased.     
 
In the second case where  0 = κ  and  0 > c , we assume that individuals believe that c 




= i P  and 
2 2
1
µ η σ σ +
= z P , but in this case, these are constants, not functions of X.  In 
this case, the signal extraction formula delivers: 
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Z = 2 λ .   
 
Both models of learning deliver a linear formula where the expected value of A equals a 
constant, plus a slope parameter times the individual’s own “X” characteristic plus a 
multiplier times that slope parameter times the average value of “X” in the individual’s 
group.  In the first learning process, the linear formulation is an approximation to a fully 
rational non-linear signal extraction formula.  In the second formulation, the linear 
formulation is an exact representation of an imperfectly rational learning process.     
 
We will use the linear formulation  ( ) i j i i X X K A E ε λδ δ + + + = ˆ , which might reflect 
either learning process.  This formula implies that average belief in community j equals 
j X K ˆ ) 1 ( δ λ + +  plus any noise that is not averaged away.  The social learning means that 
the impact of “X” on group level beliefs will be stronger than the impact of “X” on 
individual beliefs.  The term   λ + 1  is the ratio of the impact of “X” on beliefs at the 
group level divided by the impact of “X” on beliefs within groups, which we refer to as 
the social multiplier.     
 
While our signal extraction description describes only one form of social learning, the 
reduced form relationship  () i j i i X X K A E ε λδ δ + + + = ˆ  does seem to capture the robust 
empirical relationships between many beliefs and exogenous variables, such as the 
connections between education and belief in heaven or income and the belief that 
abortion is wrong.   Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) show the relation between different 
forms of education in the Islamic world and beliefs about who is responsible for the 
September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center.  DiTella, Galiani, and 
Schargrodsky (2007) find that beliefs about capitalism are altered with an allocation of 
property rights.  Our belief formation equation is simply meant to admit the possibility 
that beliefs are correlated with individual and aggregate characteristics.     9
 
With this formulation of beliefs, individual outcomes satisfy: 
 
(3)    i j i i X X K Y ε γλδ β γδ γ + + + + = ˆ ) (,  
 
and group outcomes equal:  j j j X K Y ε β λ γδ γ ˆ ˆ ) ) 1 ( ( ˆ + + + + = .  Table 1 lists the model’s 
predictions about the coefficients when outcomes are regressed on the exogenous 
variable.   
 
Since γ  and β  are always positive, when δ  is also positive, then the impact of social 
learning will be to create a social multiplier where aggregate coefficients are bigger than 
individual coefficients.  In that probably more common case, people with higher values 
of “X” choose higher levels of “Y” both because of the direct effect and the indirect 
effect through beliefs.  The belief effect becomes larger at the aggregate level because of 
social learning and this causes the aggregate coefficient to be larger than the individual 
coefficient. 
 
The more interesting case, that can explain aggregation reversals, occurs when δ  is 
negative, and the indirect effect of “X” on “Y” that works through beliefs goes in the 
opposite direction of the direct effect of “X” on “Y”.    An aggregation reversal requires 

















λ δ γ β .  An aggregation reversal also requires the aggregate 
regression coefficient of “Y” on “X” to be negative, which requires  () β λ δ γ > + 1 .     
Putting these conditions together implies that an aggregation reversal requires:   
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   10
The intuition of this inequality is that the social multiplier in beliefs must be higher than 
the ratio of the direct effect of “X” on “Y” to the indirect effect that works through 
beliefs, but this ratio must still be greater than one plus a term that is small when 
) (





 is small.  When 
) (





 is close to zero, then the inequality means 
that the ratio of direct to indirect effects must be greater than one and less than the social 
multiplier.     
 
The model predicts when we should expect aggregation reversals.  First, there must be a 
correlation between the exogenous variable and beliefs that works in the opposite 
direction as the direct relationship between the exogenous variable and the outcome.   
Second, there must be a sizable social multiplier in the formation of beliefs, so that the 
relationship between beliefs and the exogenous variable is larger at the aggregate level 
than at the individual level.  In the next section, we discuss our empirical strategy for 
estimating these parameters to assess whether the model can explain the aggregation 
reversals shown in Figures 1 through 6.    
  
III.  Discrete Outcomes and Empirical Implementation 
 
In this section, we discuss an empirical approach to our model of aggregation reversals.  
Our approach is to estimate the key parameters using a set of empirical moments that 
excludes the aggregate relationship between exogenous variables and outcomes and then 
to see if those parameters predict the aggregation reversal.  This approach is certainly not 
an attempt to refute any alternative models of the observed aggregation reversals.  Our 
goal is just to show that our model is at least a plausible explanation of these phenomena.   
 
In keeping with the model, we will continue to focus on one independent variable in each 
case, either income or education.  The model is aimed at explaining an aggregation 
reversal of a univariate relationship, but we neither mean to suggest that other variables 
don’t matter, and nor to suggest that our coefficients are causal. In all cases, we are 
comfortable with the interpretation that the estimated univariate relationship reflects both   11
the impact of the independent variable and other omitted variables that are correlated 
with that variable.  The relationship between income and Republicanism that we examine 
surely reflects many things that are correlated with income.  This is not a problem for the 
model and we will not try to isolate any effects that reflect income alone. 
 
We presented the model in a continuous formulation to make it more intuitive, but our 
examples will involve discrete outcomes and discrete beliefs.  To move from the theory 
to the data, we assume that the observed outcome variable takes on a value a zero or one, 
which captures voting for Bush or attending church or owning a gun.  We assume that 
individuals choose an outcome of one when  i j i i X X K Y ε γλδ β γδ γ + + + + = ˆ ) (,   i s  
positive.  We assume that all of the relevant noise terms are normally distributed, and let 
(.) z F  denote the cumulative distribution function and  (.) z f  denotes the density for a 
normal random variable z.    
 
The expected share of people living in place j who choose the positive outcome will 
equal  ( ) j z X K F ˆ ) ) 1 ( (
1 β λ γδ + + + , where  i j i X X z ε β γδ + − + = ) ˆ )( ( 1 .   We assume that 
1 z   has the same distribution in each community.  The average marginal effect of  j X ˆ  on 
the share of the population that chooses one will equal 
() () ∫ + + + + +
j j z dj
J
X K f
1 ˆ ) ) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( (
1 β λ γδ β λ γδ , if there are measure J communities, so 
the average marginal effect of  j X ˆ  continues to be  β λ γδ + + ) 1 (  as shown in Table 1.   
 
Within a community, for a given value of x, the share of people who choose one will 
equal  ( ) j i X X K F ˆ ) ( γλδ β γδ ε + + + .  If the distribution of X within the community is 
characterized by a density function g(X), the estimated marginal effect of “X” is 
( ) ∫ + + + +
x i j i dx X g X X K f ) ( ˆ ) ( ) ( γλδ β γδ β γδ ε ,  so the average effect of x within 
communities is again  β γδ + .    We will use the estimated within group coefficient to 
provide us with an estimate of  β γδ + .   
   12
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.  As such, the 
existence of discrete outcome variables does require Probit estimation techniques, but it 
does not change the connection between the parameters of the model and relationship 
between exogenous variable and outcomes.    
 
We assume that the “X” variable is mean zero and variance one and we will normalize 
our independent variables appropriately in the empirical work.  The parameter 
) (





 can be measured directly from the data, as it reflects the share of variation 
in “X” that is across group rather than within group.  This parameter can be estimated 
with the share of the variation in “X” that is explained by group dummies.   We will scale 
our “X” variables so that they have a mean of zero and a variance of one, so the missing 
parameter is just the  ) ˆ , ( j i X X Cov .  
 
We also assume that we do not measure beliefs directly but rather see several discrete 
measures of beliefs that take on values of one when 
k
i k A E ξ ψ + ) (  is positive. For 
example, in the case of religious belief, we have questions on statements about belief in 
the devil and beliefs in the literal truth of the Bible.  The parameter  k ψ  reflects the 
relationship between the relevant beliefs and the particular discrete measure. The term 
k
i ξ  
is an error term specific to the person and the measure of beliefs.   By scaling δ  and the 
error terms appropriately, we can always ensure that the latent belief variable has a 
variance of one.  We also normalize  ) ( 1
2 k
i k Var ξ ψ = −  so that the variance of the belief 
proxies also equals one.  These assumptions are innocuous scaling assumptions about 
unobserved latent variables that drive the zero-one decision.   
 
Within a given group, the share of the population that answers yes to belief question k is 
( ) ) ˆ ) 1 ( (
2 j j z X K F δ λ ψ + +  where  ( )
j
i i j i j X X z ξ ε δ ψ + + − = ) ˆ ( 2 .  The estimated marginal   13
effect of  j X ˆ  will be   ( ) ∫ + + +
j j j z k dj
J
X K f
1 ˆ ) 1 ( ( ) 1 (
2 δ λ ψ λ δ ψ  and the average effect will 
be ) 1 ( λ δ ψ + k .  Within groups, the estimated marginal effect of x on beliefs will be   δ ψ k  
so the ratio will again give us the social multiplier.   As such, we use the within group 
belief regressions to estimate  δ ψ k  and the ratio of the coefficient on “X” from within 
group and across group regressions to estimate the social multiplier.   
  
We estimate the parameter  k ψ  by assuming that we have two potential proxies for the 
underlying beliefs. If  k ψ  is the same for both of these proxies, then covariance of the two 
underlying normal variables is equal to 
2
k ψ .  This covariance is empirically implied by 
the means and covariance of the two discrete measures of underlying beliefs.  If the two 
values of   k ψ  are not the same, then the potential range for  k ψ  is between the underlying 
covariance and one and we can consider this entire range for this variable.   
  
Our final moment is the relationship between beliefs and outcomes.  In both cases, we 
observe a discrete proxy for the relevant underlying variables  i Y  and 
k
i i k A E ξ ψ + ) (.   
Again, we can use the means of the two discrete variables and their covariance to 
estimate the underlying covariance of the two normal variables.  The model predicts that 
this underlying covariance will equal   ( ) ) ˆ , ( 1 ( j i k X X Cov λ βδ γ ψ + + .    
  
Table 1 lists these set of predictions that we use to estimate the parameters.  We need 
estimates of six parameters:  β , γ , δ , λ,  k ψ  and  ) ˆ , ( j i X X Cov .  We use six moments 
to estimate these parameters: (1) the within group relationship between exogenous 
variable and outcome, (2) the amount of variation in the exogenous variable that is within 
group, (3) the within-group effect of the exogenous variable on the proxy for beliefs, (4) 
the across-group effect of the exogenous variable on the proxy for beliefs, (5) the 
correlation of different proxies for beliefs and (6) the individual level covariance between 
the proxy for beliefs and the outcome variable.  We will then see whether these   14
parameters predict an aggregation reversal and whether they come close to predicting the 
observed aggregate relationship between the outcome and the exogenous variable.   
 
The square root of the covariance of the latent belief variables provides our estimate of 
k ψ .  The share of variation in X that is explained by group dummies estimates 
) ˆ , ( j i X X Cov .  The ratio of the aggregation relationship between the exogenous variable 
and the belief proxy and the within-group relationship between the exogenous variable 
and the belief proxy delivers  λ + 1 .  The ratio of the within-group relationship between 
the exogenous variable and the belief proxy and the square root of the covariance of the 
latent belief variables delivers δ .   
 
The value of β  is found by subtracting  k ψ δ /  times the estimated covariance of the 
latent belief proxy and the latent outcome from the estimated within group marginal 
effect of the exogenous variable on the outcome and then dividing by 
) ˆ , ( 1
2 2
j i X X Cov λ δ δ − − . The value of γ  is found by subtracting this estimate of  β  
from the estimated within-group effect of the exogenous variable on the outcome and 
then dividing by the estimate of δ .   
 
IV.  Income and Republicanism 
 
The aggregation reversal that occurs in the relationship between income and 
Republicanism is quite striking.  At the individual level, there is a modest positive 
relationship between earnings and voting for President Bush in 2000.  According to the 
National Annenberg Election Study of 2000, 55 percent of the top quintile of the income 
distribution voted for the Republican in 2000; 36 percent of the bottom quintile of the 
income distributed voted for him in the same year.  This positive income-Republicanism 
relationship certainly corresponds with popular notions of Republicanism, but those 
notions are seemingly contradicted by the profoundly negative relationship between 
income and Republicanism at the state level shown in Figure 2.  The correlation 
coefficient is –.57.   15
 
The model seems to have a reasonable chance of explaining this aggregation reversal 
because of the multiple aspects of Republicanism.  In post-Reagan America, 
Republicanism has been associated with both lower taxes, which presumably appeal to 
the wealthy and conservative social stances (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro, 2005).   
Republicans have regularly championed school prayer and limits on abortion.  The appeal 
of these social stances depends on conservative social beliefs that are not positively 
correlated with income.   In the Annenberg data set, the correlation between income and 
the propensity to say that the government should not put limits on abortion is 10 percent.   
The combination of a direct relationship between income and the financial returns from 
low tax Republican policies and an indirect relationship where income decreases 
conservative social beliefs which decreases the support for Republicanism suggests that 
our model may indeed explain the observed aggregation reversal.  
 
To test this hypothesis, we use the Annenberg data to estimate the parameters of the 
model.  We will then see whether these estimated parameters predict an aggregation 
reversal and the coefficient seen in the aggregate data.   We estimate an aggregate 
marginal effect of log income on the propensity to vote for Bush of -.274 using Federal 
Election Commission voting records and 2000 Census data on income, with a standard 
error of .058.  This estimation is done using nonlinear least squares to fit the data to a 
cumulative normal function. This reflects our assumption that the underlying 
heterogeneity in political preferences is normally distributed.  The ordinary least squares 
estimate is -.272 with a standard error of .057. 
 
We have two different belief variables that we use in our estimation: survey responses to 
questions as to whether “the federal government should not put limits on abortion,” and 
“the government should not support prayer in schools.”  In both cases, we have reduced 
the answers to these questions to taking on two values.  The first column of Table 2 
shows the results using the first question; the second column shows the results using the 
second question.   
   16
Two of our empirical moments are independent of the choice of belief variable.  The 
marginal impact of income on voting for Bush, our estimate of  β γδ + , is found using a 
Probit equation with state fixed effects on the Annenberg data.  As shown in the first row 
of Table 2, we estimate .055 for this coefficient.  The estimate of 
) (





 is based 
on the amount of variation in income explained by state fixed effects.  The second row of 
Table 2 shows our estimate of .023 for this parameter.  We have also estimated this 
sorting parameter using the Census Individual Public Use Micro Samples (IPUMS) and 
found a similar parameter estimate of .022.   
 
As described above, we need the correlation between the two questions to form our 
estimate of  k ψ  which is based on the correlation of the two variables.  The third row of 
Table 2 shows the estimated covariance of the latent belief variables of .143 which is our 
estimate of 
2
k ψ .     
 
The remaining rows in the table give estimates that differ between the two belief 
questions.  In the fifth row, we show the estimated impact of income on beliefs within 
states, which is our estimate of  δ ψ k .   This estimate is -0.041 in the case of support for 
limits on abortion and -0.079 in the case of opposition to prayer in school.  Income is 
more strongly negatively correlated with beliefs about prayer in school than with beliefs 
about limits on abortion.  The sixth row shows the associated value of δ  which is found 
by dividing this estimate by our estimate of  k ψ . This parameter estimate is -.109 in the 
case of the abortion question and -.210 for the prayer question.   
 
The seventh row gives the state level marginal impact of the logarithm of income on the 
share of the population that answers yes to the two questions.  In both cases, the 
estimated coefficient explodes.  In the case of limits on abortion, the group-level 
coefficient rises to -.399 and in the case of school prayer the group level coefficient rises 
to -.477.  The much stronger aggregate relationship supports the hypothesis of a social   17
multiplier, although sorting on omitted variables could explain some part of the observed 
group level relationship.   
 
In the eighth row, we report the value of λ  implied by the ratio of group level effects to 
individual effects.  In the case of abortion, this parameter is 8.73.  In the case of school 
prayer it is 5.02.  We also find evidence for social multipliers when we examine 
relationships at lower levels of aggregation.  Perhaps it is surprising to estimate social 
multipliers that are this strong, but these findings are certainly in line with the social 
psychology literature that argues that beliefs like these are very much the product of 
social interactions.   
 
In the ninth row, we show the estimated covariance of the latent outcome variable 
(support for Bush) and the latent belief variable.   There is a higher covariance in the case 
of the abortion question, .219, then in the case of the school prayer question, .148.  This 
higher correlation reflects the stronger connection between Republicanism and views on 
abortion than between Republicanism and views on school prayer.   
 
The tenth and eleventh rows give our estimates of γ  and β , the impact of beliefs on 
voting for Bush and the direct effect of income on voting for Bush.  In both cases, beliefs 
seem to have a much stronger impact on voting Republican than income.  We estimate γ  
coefficients of .598 and .432 for the abortion and prayer questions respectively.  When 
we use the abortion question, we estimate a direct effect of income (β ) of .144.  When 
we use the prayer question, we estimate a higher direct effect of income of .170.      
 
The twelfth row gives the predicted group level relationship between income and voting 
for Bush implied by these parameters.  In both cases, the model predicts a healthy 
aggregation reversal.  Using the abortion question, we predict a negative relationship of -
.488 and with the prayer relationship we predict a negative relationship of -.377.  This 
predicted relationship should be compared to the actual aggregate relationship of -.274 
shown in the thirteenth row.   
   18
The predicted value found by using the school prayer question is reasonably close to the 
actual aggregate relationship; the prediction based on the abortion question is far too 
negative.   Although given the imprecision of our estimates, it is not clear that we should 
make too much of these findings.  We suspect that we are predicting too much of an 
aggregation reversal, because we are overestimating the size of the social multiplier in the 
case of the abortion question.  For example, if we used the social multiplier estimated 
using the school prayer question but continued to use all of the other moments of the 
abortion question, then our predicted aggregate relationship would be much closer to the 
actual aggregate relationship.    
 
V.  Religion and Education 
 
We now revisit the connection between education and religion discussed in Glaeser and 
Sacerdote (2002).   At the individual level, more educated people attend church more 
often.  In the General Social Survey, 53 percent of college graduates attend church once 
per month or more while 45 percent of high school dropouts attend that frequently.   
However, more educated denominations are far less religious than less educated 
denominations.  Figure 4 shows the correlation between average years of education and 
church attendance across denominations.  
 
As in the case of voting Republican, there are at least two different reasons to go to 
church.  First, going to church is a conventional social activity that connects people 
within a community and provides certain type of services for children.  Second, going to 
church is thought by some to yield otherworldly returns, such as going to heaven.   
Religious beliefs are surely based on social influences.  Where else would most people 
come up with their views about the afterlife?   These two different functions of church 
attendance—one of which is highly dependent on socially formed beliefs and one of 
which is not—suggest that our model can possibly explain the aggregation reversal.  
 
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002) provide evidence that education predicts participation in 
almost every formal social activity at the individual level.  Education predicts   19
membership in political clubs, fraternal clubs, hobbyist associations and even sports 
clubs.  In this light, it seems unsurprising that education also predicts membership in 
religious groups and attendance at church.  There are several possible explanations of this 
fact.  Group membership may be seen as a form of investment in social capital and 
people who live investing in human capital may also see returns to social capital.   
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2006) argue that education includes heavy doses of 
socialization that increases the ability to interact effectively with others.  If education 
directly increases the returns to social activity and if church-going is a social activity, 
then this creates a direct effect where education should increase the amount of church 
attendance.   
 
Religion is, of course, not just another social club.  Most religious groups also promise 
some forms of otherworldly returns to religious adherence.  Yet education generally 
predicts less belief in the supernatural.  For example, belief in heaven, the devil and the 
literal truth of the bible all decline strong with years of education.  There are several 
possible interpretations of this phenomenon.  One view is that these phenomena are at 
odds with modern science and more education naturally includes more of the science that 
disproves religious belief.  An alternative view argues that secular education is often anti-
clerical and the negative relation between education and religion reflects the impact of 
secularist indoctrination.  We take no view in this debate, but simply note the robust 
negative relationship between years of schooling and religious beliefs.   
 
Whatever negative effects exist between education and religious beliefs at the individual 
level, they do appear to be magnified at the denomination level.  Figure 7 shows the 
negative relationship between average years of schooling in a denomination and belief in 
the devil.  This magnification may well reflect the social formation of beliefs.  Educated 
denominations contain people who are less likely to be strong believers and who speak 
those views regularly.  The more educated denominations are also more likely to have 
educated religious leaders who are less likely to be strong believers and who themselves 
determine the basic tenets of the denomination.  More educated denominations are more   20
likely to have sermons discussing nuanced ethical issues rather than strong statements 
affirming the literal truth of the bible or the damnation of non-believers.    
 
We will use belief in the devil and the literal truth of the bible for our calibration.  While 
these variables take on 4 and 3 values respectively in the General Social Survey, we 
reduce them to binary variables based on the mean response.  Our calibrations appear in 
Table 3.  In the first row, we describe the within denomination relationship between 
education and attendance of .031.  Education has been normalized to have a standard 
deviation of one, so this coefficient means that a one standard deviation increase in 
education is associated with a 3.1 percent increase in the probability that an individual 
will attend church regularly.   
 
In the second row, we give the share of the variation in education that is explained by 
denomination fixed effects: 5.6 percent.  Education is more closely linked to 
denomination than income is to states. The third row gives the correlation of latent belief 
variables implied by the correlation of our two proxies for beliefs and the fourth row 
shows that this implies a value for  j ψ  of .412.   
 
The fifth row gives the marginal impact of education on belief within denominations.  In 
both cases, more educated people are less likely to have strong religious beliefs.  A one 
standard deviation increase in education is associated with a 3.2 percent decrease in the 
propensity to say that the bible is the literal truth and an 11.8 percent decrease in the 
propensity to believe in the devil.  When we divide these values by our estimate of  k ψ  in 
the sixth row, we estimate of δ  to be  -.078 and -.287 for the bible and devil question 
respectively.   
 
In the seventh and eighth rows, we show the results of the cross denomination regressions 
of beliefs on education and the implied social multiplier.  In the case of the bible 
question, we estimate an aggregate coefficient of -.6 and a value for λ  of 17.7   In the 
case of the devil question, somewhat appropriately, we estimate an aggregate coefficient 
of -.666 and estimate λ  to be 4.6.  The denomination level coefficients are almost   21
identical and the difference in the social multiplier is driven primarily by the lower 
individual level relationship between education and belief in the literal truth of the bible.   
 
The ninth row delivers the implied covariance between the latent belief variable and the 
latent attendance variable which is .148 in the case of the bible question and .13 in the 
case of the devil question.  The ninth row shows that these covariances imply almost 
identical values of γ  for the two belief questions: .369 and .365.  In both cases, higher 
beliefs are strongly associated with greater propensity to attend church.  The similar 
estimates of γ  imply quite different estimated values for β : .06 for the bible question 
and .139 for the devil question. The difference is driven by the much stronger correlation 
between education and belief in the devil than between education and belief in the literal 
truth of the bible.   
 
The twelfth and thirteenth rows give the predicted and actual aggregate relationships 
between education and religious attendance.  In both cases, the parameters predict a 
robust aggregation reversal.  With the bible question, our parameters predict an 
aggregation reversal of -.479 and, with the devil question, we predict an aggregation 
reversal of -.454.  The actual aggregate relationship is -.314.  We again predict too 
negative a relationship, although our standard errors are sufficiently big that these 
differences are only modestly statistically different. 
 
There are many possible explanations for our overly negative predictions.  In the case of 
the bible question, we suspect that our estimate of the social multiplier is too high.  In the 
case of the devil question, we may have overestimated the magnitude of δ , the 
connection between education and beliefs.  As before, we think the lesson of this 
calibration is that the model is more effective at predicting the sign of the aggregate 
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VI.  Income and Military 
 
We now turn to our final aggregation reversal: the relationship between income and 
military service.  Figure 5 shows the positive relationship between veteran status, which 
is defined as having had some military service, and family income at the individual level.  
This relationship we show uses data from the General Social Survey, but the Census 
shows similar results.  This relationship surely reflects some amount of both treatment 
and selection, but when we look at parental occupation status in the General Social 
Survey, we also find an -.02 percent correlation between higher income occupations and 
entering into the army.   People from the lowest socioeconomic backgrounds tend not to 
join the army, either because they are not allowed in or because they choose not to join.   
 
Figure 6 shows the relationship between income and military service at the state level 
using the 2000 census.  In this case, we look only at people born after 1950 which means 
that we are looking almost mainly at people who have volunteered.  Alternative cutoff 
dates make little difference.   People from lower income states are much more likely to 
join the military than people from higher income states.  The Northeast trio of 
Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey are particularly unlikely to have members in 
the military.   
 
One explanation for this phenomenon that corresponds well with standard prejudices 
about red and blue states is that people in high income areas are less likely to believe in 
army and military service.  At the individual level, perhaps, relatively anti-war teachers 
perhaps tell students that fighting in armies is bad.  Perhaps, high levels of income 
correlate with a dislike of the self-sacrifice that military service entails.   
 
We use two belief variables to look at enthusiasm for the army.  The first belief variable 
is a question about whether respondents think that the army is a good experience for men.  
The second belief variable is whether respondents have confidence in the army as an 
institution.  In both cases, income and education are negatively correlated with the pro-
military belief.   In both cases, the correlations between income and beliefs at the state   23
level are significantly stronger than the correlations at income and beliefs at the 
individual level.   
 
Table 4 yields the parameter estimates for this example.  The first row gives the within 
state relationship between income and military service.  A one standard deviation in log 
of income is associated with a 5.9 percent increase in the probability of having a veteran 
in the household.  The second column provides the variation in income explained by state 
dummies which is the same parameter that appeared in our first example.   
 
The third and fourth columns display the estimated covariance of the latent belief 
variables and the implied value of  k ψ : .335.  These belief variables are less correlated 
than the belief variables in the previous examples.  The fifth row shows the estimated 
impact of income on beliefs within states and the sixth row shows the implied value of 
δ .  We estimate that a one standard deviation increase in income is associated with a 10 
percent decrease in pro-military beliefs, using the first question, and an eight percent 
decrease in pro-military beliefs when we use the second question.  In this case, the 
estimates of δ  using the two different questions seem reasonably close. 
 
The seventh and eighth rows give the estimated impact of income on pro-military beliefs 
across states and the implied values for λ .  The implied values of λ  are 2.6 and 5.9.   
The confidence in the army question appears to have a much stronger social multiplier.  
 
The ninth row gives the implied covariance of the latent belief variable with the outcome.  
In the case of the question about the military being a good experience, the correlation is 
robust.  The tenth row shows that this correlation implies that γ  equals .58 for the 
question about the benefits of military service.  The latent correlation between confidence 
in the army and military service is almost zero and this implies a value of .037 for γ .  
This small connection between beliefs and outcomes makes an aggregation reversal 
unlikely.   
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In the eleventh row, we show the implied values of β  which is .12 when we use the 
question about the military being a good experience and .06 when we use confidence in 
the army.  These higher values in the case of the good experience come from a higher 
estimate of γ .  When the impact of beliefs is estimated to be higher, then the direct effect 
of income must also be higher.   
 
Finally in the twelfth and thirteenth rows, we look at the predicted and actual aggregate 
relationship between income and military service.  In the case of the good experience 
question, we predict an aggregate relationship of -.098 when the actual relationship is -
.092.  In the case of the confidence in the army question, our low estimate of γ  means we 
fail to estimate an aggregate reversal and predict an aggregate coefficient of .042. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
This paper presents a model of aggregation reversals where individual relationships have 
the opposite sign from group relationships.  In the model, aggregation reversals occur 
when the exogenous variable impacts the outcomes through two channels.  In one of the 
channels, there is a social multiplier, so the aggregate relationship between the exogenous 
variable and the outcome increases at higher levels of aggregation.  We focus on the case 
where the exogenous variable is correlated with beliefs, because we believe social 
influence is a critical determinant of most beliefs.  The model predicts that aggregation 
reversals will occur when the ratio of the direct effect of the exogenous variable on the 
outcome to the belief effect negative and is somewhat greater in absolute value than one 
and less than the social multiplier. 
 
We applied the model to three examples of aggregation reversals.  We did not try to rule 
out other alternative theories or identify causal parameters.  Instead, we asked whether 
parameter values that were estimated from individual level relationships and the 
aggregate relationship between beliefs and the exogenous variable would predict the 
aggregation reversal that we see in the data.  Our work does not rule out alternative 
explanations, but rather tries to establish some degree of plausibility for our theory.     25
 
We examined the relationship between income and voting for George Bush in 2000, the 
relationship between education and religious attendance and the relationship between 
income and military service.  We used two different belief variables for each aggregation 
reversal yielding six different predictions about aggregate relationships.  Our calibration 
exercise had successes and failures.  In five out of six cases, the parameters did predict an 
aggregation reversal.  Except for the one case where we don’t predict an aggregation 
reversal, we estimate a large relationship between beliefs and outcomes and a large social 
multiplier in the formation of beliefs.  Together these tend to predict an aggregation 
reversal.  In many cases, we predict too much of a reversal because our estimated social 
multiplier is quite large.   
 
The paper suggests that the social formation of beliefs and the resulting social multipliers 
may be significant determinants of important aggregate phenomena.  These three 
aggregation reversals are hardly the only such cases that exist.  Figures 7 and 8 show the 
aggregation reversal in the relationship between gun ownership and income.  In all of the 
cases we examined, we found substantial social multipliers in beliefs, but omitted 
variables that could be driving these findings.  We hope that future empirical work will 
put more effort on more cleanly identified estimates of the magnitude of social learning.   
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Table 1: Predictions of the Model 
 




β γδ +  
Marginal Impacts of the 
Exogenous Variable on 
the Outcome Variable 
Group Level   β λ γδ + + ) 1 ( 




δ ψ k  
Marginal Impact of the 
Exogenous Variable on 
Proxies for Belief   Group Level   δ ψ λ k ) 1 ( +  
Covariance of latent proxies for belief  2
k ψ  
Covariance of latent proxies for belief with latent 
outcome variable  ( ) ) ˆ , ( j i k X X Cov βδλ βδ γ ψ + +    29
 
 
Table 2: Parameters for the Relationship between Income and Voting for Bush 
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Table 3: Parameters for the Relationship between Education and Attendance 
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Table 4: Parameters for the Relationship between Military Service and Income 
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Data Appendix 
 
Voting and Income:  State level voting results in 2000 are from the Federal Election 
Commission.    State level income for 2000 is calculated from the Individual Public Use 
Micro data available at ipums.org and uses the household income measure. 
 
Micro data are from the National Annenberg Election Survey 2000.    The data CD Rom 
accompanies the volume Romer, Daniel, Kate Kenski, Paul Waldman, Christopher 
Adasiewicz and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Capturing Campaign Dynamic, (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 2004.  We use only the data collection waves that occurred 
after the election and code as voting for Bush all those who report voting for Bush.  We 
code as 0 those voting for Gore or some other candidate.  The abortion variable is coded 
so that a 1 is given to those who respond that the federal government should not restrict 
abortion.  Those who respond that the federal govt should restrict are coded as 0.    Those 
who say the federal government should NOT allow school prayer are coded as a 1 and 
those who say the federal government should allow school prayer are coded as 0. 
 
Attendance and Education:  We use the General Social Survey 2004 data.  For 
attendance, we use the variable ATTEND and code as a 1 those who attend religious 
services once per month or more.  For beliefs about the devil we use the variable DEVIL 
and code as a 1 those who say "yes definitely" or "yes probably" when asked if they 
believe in the Devil.  Our recoded variable has a mean of 62 percent. For beliefs about 
the bible, we code as 1 those who respond that "The Bible is the actual word of God and 







   37
For denomination, we divide respondents into 10 denominations using the variables 
RELIG4 and DENOM.  Our 10 denominations and frequencies are  
        Religion       Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
         Baptist       9,547       20.64       20.64 
        Catholic      11,417       24.69       45.33 
    Episcopalian       1,103        2.38       47.71 
             Jew         973        2.10       49.82 
        Lutheran       3,127        6.76       56.58 
       Methodist       4,662       10.08       66.66 
     No Religion       4,292        9.28       75.94 
Nondenom_Protest       1,965        4.25       80.19 
      Other_Prot       5,930       12.82       93.01 
  Other_Religion       1,340        2.90       95.91 
    Presbyterian       1,893        4.09      100.00 
           Total      46,249      100.00 
 
Military Status and Income:  We use the General Social Survey 2004 data.  We use the 
inflation adjusted income number from the variable REALINC.  We use the variable 
VETYEARS to infer whether the respondent has any military experience.  The mean of 
our variable for military service is 18.7 percent.   For beliefs we use MILOK and code as 
a 1 anyone who believes that the military offers a good experience for men.  The mean of 
our recoded variable is 62.4 percent.  We also use CONARMY and code as a 1 anyone 
who has "a great deal of confidence in the military."  This variable has a mean of 62 
percent.   
 